American grand strategy after war /
The Triangle Institute for Security Studies (TISS), the Duke University Program in American Grand Strategy, and the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College (USAWC) conducted a colloquium and recognition of TISS's 50th anniversary at the Duke University and University of North C...
| Corporate Author: | |
|---|---|
| Other Authors: | , |
| Format: | Government Document eBook |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
[Carlisle, Pa.] :
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College,
[2009]
|
| Series: | Colloquium brief.
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://purl.fdlp.gov/GPO/gpo1556 |
| Summary: | The Triangle Institute for Security Studies (TISS), the Duke University Program in American Grand Strategy, and the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College (USAWC) conducted a colloquium and recognition of TISS's 50th anniversary at the Duke University and University of North Carolina campuses on February 26-28, 2009. The colloquium, entitled "American Grand Strategy after War," examined debates over grand strategy after World War II, Korea, Vietnam, and the Cold War, and grand strategies likely to follow U.S. involvement in Iraq. A panel was devoted to each period and consisted of a summarization of a draft paper by its author and a critique by two panelists who had received the paper at an earlier date. Key insights are as follows: since World War II, each American war has been followed by a period of grand strategy reassessment; the degree to which the Nation's leaders have felt the need to revise grand strategy has depended in part upon the degree to which the preceding conflict led to adverse consequences, and in part upon the level of perceived danger in the new strategic environment; the locus for grand strategy reassessment is the U.S. President; presidents have varied in their perception of the need for reassessment and in their effectiveness in conducting and implementing reassessments; it is difficult to apply lessons gained from previous reassessments to the post-Iraq period without knowing the strategic environment of that future period; President Obama has not previously been involved in the formulation of grand strategy, making it difficult to predict either what his grand strategy will be, or the likelihood of its success; we get some hints of its content from campaign statements and subsequent policies. |
|---|---|
| Item Description: | Title from PDF title screen (viewed on Dec. 1, 2010). Monograph. Electronic resource. |
| Physical Description: | 1 onine resource (4 pages). |
| Access: | Approved for public release. |